Trustors’ disregard for trustees deciding quickly or slowly in three experiments with time constraints

Many decisions in the economic and social domain are made under time constraints, be it under time pressure or forced delay. Requiring individuals to decide quickly or slowly often elicit different responses. Time pressure has been associated with inefficiency in market settings and market regulation often requires individuals to delay their decisions via cooling-off periods. Yet, recent research suggests that people who make reflective decisions are met with distrust. If this extends to external time constraints, then forcing individuals to delay their decisions may be counterproductive in scenarios where trust considerations are important, such as in market and organizational design. In three Trust Game experiments (total number of participants = 1872), including within- and between-subjects designs, we test whether individuals trust (more) someone who is forced to respond quickly (intuitively) or slowly (reflectively). We find that trustors do not adjust their behavior (or their beliefs) to the trustee’s time conditions. This seems to be an appropriate response because time constraints do not affect trustees’ behavior, at least when the game decisions are binary (trust vs. don’t trust; reciprocate vs. don’t reciprocate) and therefore mistakes cannot explain choices. Thus, delayed decisions per se do not seem to elicit distrust.


SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS Trustors' disregard for trustees deciding quickly or slowly in three experiments with time constraints
and probit (model 2: amount sent between 2 and 5) estimates. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Marginal effects are reported below standard errors for probit models. Main explanatory variable: tdelay takes the value of 1 for the time delay condition, 0 for the time pressure condition. Controls: male takes the value of 1 if male, 0 otherwise; CRT score refers to the number of correct answers in the CRT (from 0 to 7); envy refers to the number of envious choices in the distributional preferences task (from 0 to 3); compassion refers to the number of compassionate choices in the distributional preferences task (from 0 to 3); impatience refers to the number of impatient choices in the time preferences task (from 0 to 20); risk aversion refers to the number of risk averse choices in the risk preferences task (from 0 to 10). * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  Table S1); exp trustworthiness refers to the expected proportion of trustworthy trustees in the corresponding condition. Controls: loss aversion refers to the number of loss averse choices in the loss aversion task (from 0 to 6). See notes on Table S1 for the remaining controls. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.  (1.215) Notes: OLS estimates (amount returned). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Wald Tests on the interaction coefficients: a received + tdelay X a received refers to the effect of amount received in the time delay condition (for the time pressure condition, the effect is given by the coefficient of amount received); tdelay + tdelay X a received*Z refers to the effect of time delay for an amount received of $Z. Controls: see notes on Table S1. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001.

Screen 1
Welcome You have been selected at random as an individual A and will be paired with an individual B (also selected at random).
You (individual A) have received a $10 endowment which will be used for decision making in the experiment. Individual B has received a $10 endowment as well. Individual B will keep their initial endowment regardless of the decision either you or they make.
You (individual A) will make your decision first.
Individual B will make their decision after you.
Please familiarize yourself with the slider bar by clicking in the area that says "Click Here". It will be used in the decision making stage. Individual B can only make their decision after [before] 10 seconds has elapsed. That is, after being informed of the amount received, they can only make their final decision after [before] 10 seconds has elapsed.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and a monitor will come by to answer them. If you are finished with the instructions, please click the Start button. The instructions will remain 9 on your screen until everyone has clicked the Start button. We need everyone to click the Start button before we can begin.
[After clicking on "Start". Example of actual decision]

Screen 1
Welcome You have been selected at random as an individual B and will be paired with an individual A (also selected at random).
Individual A has received a $10 endowment which will be used for decision making in the experiment. You (individual B ) have received a $10 endowment as well. You will keep your initial endowment regardless of the decision either you or individual A makes.
Individual A will make their decision first.

You (individual B) will make your decision after individual A.
Please familiarize yourself with the slider bar by clicking in the area that says "Click Here". It will be used in the decision making stage.
[After clicking on "Click Here". Example of practice decision] the identity of the other individual. Similarly, the other individual will not know any details about you. Please do not talk to anyone during the experiment.

The Decision Task
You (individual B) will receive a certain amount of money. This amount is 3 times the amount that individual A sent you.
Individual A can send you any proportion of their $10 endowment and knows that the amount sent is multiplied by 3.
You have to decide how much (between $0 and "the amount received") of this multiplied amount to return to individual A. You can only make your decision after [before] a 10 second timer has elapsed.
Your Profit = Endowment + (Multiplied amount individual A sent to you) -(Amount you returned to individual A).

You will be paid in cash at the end of the experiment.
Please make your decision after [before] the 10 second timer has finished.
If you have any questions, please raise your hand and a monitor will come by to answer them. If you are finished with the instructions, please click the Start button. The instructions will remain on your screen until everyone has clicked the Start button. We need everyone to click the Start

Distributional social preferences task PLAYER A
In this task, there are two players, player A and player B. The computer has randomly assigned you to be player A and the other player you will be matched with will be player B.
You will have to choose between two options: • If you choose option R then the task ends and you will earn 40¢ and the other player will earn 40¢.
• If you choose option L, then the other player will have to choose between two options: o If the other player chooses option Y, then you will earn 0¢ and the other player will earn 160¢.
o If the other player chooses option X, then you will earn 80¢ and the other player will earn 80¢.
The individual assigned to be PLAYER B will have to choose between options Y and X BEFORE/AFTER a 10-second timer expires. In case player B does not comply with the time constraint, then both of you will earn 40¢.
In particular, player B will see the following:

{ [instructions for the other person, player B]
In this task, there are two players, player A and player B. The computer has randomly assigned you to be player B and the other player you will be matched with will be player A.

The other player (A) has to choose between two options:
• If the other player chooses option R then the task ends and you will earn 40¢ and the other player will earn 40¢.
• If the other player chooses option L, then you will have to choose between two options.
For the case that the player A who is matched with you chooses option L, in the next screen, please choose between option Y and option X BEFORE/AFTER the 10-second timer in your screen expires (the time that counts is when you click on the option chosen, not on the Continue button).
Note: If you fail to comply with the time constraint, both of you will earn 40¢.

[next screen]
Please choose BEFORE/AFTER the time expires: o Option Y: you will earn 160¢ and the other player will earn 0¢.
o Option X: you will earn 80¢ and the other player will earn 80¢.

Remember:
• If you choose option R then the task ends and you will earn 40¢ and the other player will earn 40¢.
• If you choose option L, then the other player will have to choose between two options: o If the other player chooses option Y, then you will earn 0¢ and the other player will earn 160¢.
o If the other player chooses option X, then you will earn 80¢ and the other player will earn 80¢.

Now please make your decision:
-You are matched with a player B who has to choose before/after the 10-second timer expires: o you choose option R o you choose option L BELIEFS (common to both players) In this task, you will have to guess which percentage of participants choose each option in this experiment. If the difference between your guess and the true percentage is less than 5%, your guess will be considered "correct". You will be asked for 2 guesses. You will earn 10c extra for each correct guess.
[next screen] Remember: Player A has to choose between two options: • If player A chooses option R then the task ends and player A will earn 40¢ and player B will earn 40¢.
• If player A chooses option L, then player B will have to choose between two options: o If player B chooses option Y, then player A will earn 0¢ and player B will earn 160¢.
o If player B chooses option X, then player A will earn 80¢ and player B will earn 80¢.
Considering that player B's have to choose before/after the 10-second timer expires -Among all PLAYER A's, you have to guess the percentage of them who chose OPTION L.

Your guess is:
[slider from 0% to 100% in 5% intervals] -Among all PLAYER B's, you have to guess the percentage of them who chose OPTION X.

PLAYER B
In this task, there are two players, player A and player B. The computer has randomly assigned you to be player B and the other player you will be matched with will be player A.
The other player (A) has to choose between two options: • If the other player chooses option R then the task ends and you will earn 40¢ and the other player will earn 40¢.
• If the other player chooses option L, then you will have to choose between two options.
For the case that the player A who is matched with you chooses option L, in the next screen, please choose between option Y and option X BEFORE/AFTER the 10-second timer in your screen expires (the time that counts is when you click on the option chosen, not on the Continue button).

Note:
If you fail to comply with the time constraint, both of you will earn 40¢.

[next screen]
Please choose BEFORE/AFTER the time expires: o Option Y: you will earn 160¢ and the other player will earn 0¢.
o Option X: you will earn 80¢ and the other player will earn 80¢.

[10-second TIMER] PLAYER A
In this task, there are two players, player A and player B. The computer has randomly assigned you to be player A and the other player you will be matched with will be player B.
You will have to choose between two options: • If you choose option R then the task ends and you will earn 40¢ and the other player will earn 40¢.
• If you choose option L, then the other player will have to choose between two options: o If the other player chooses option Y, then you will earn 0¢ and the other player will earn 160¢.
o If the other player chooses option X, then you will earn 80¢ and the other player will earn 80¢.
One half of all individuals assigned to be player B (selected randomly) will have to choose between options Y and X before a 10-second timer expires, while the other half of player Bs will have to choose between Y and X after a 10-second timer expires. In case player B does not comply with the time constraint assigned, then both of you will earn 40¢.
In particular, player B will see the following (they will see either "BEFORE" or "AFTER" below depending on the time constraint they are randomly assigned):

{ [instructions for the other person, player B]
In this task, there are two players, player A and player B. The computer has randomly assigned you to be player B and the other player you will be matched with will be player A.
The other player (A) has to choose between two options: • If the other player chooses option R then the task ends and you will earn 40¢ and the other player will earn 40¢.
• If the other player chooses option L, then you will have to choose between two options.
For the case that the player A who is matched with you chooses option L, in the next screen, please choose between option Y and option X BEFORE/AFTER the 10-second timer in your screen expires (the time that counts is when you click on the option chosen, not on the Continue button).
Note: If you fail to comply with the time constraint, both of you will earn 40¢.
[next screen] Please choose BEFORE/AFTER the time expires: o Option Y: you will earn 160¢ and the other player will earn 0¢.
o Option X: you will earn 80¢ and the other player will earn 80¢.

[10-second TIMER] }
Since you will be randomly matched with one and only one player B, you will have to choose option R or L for the two possible cases (that is, for the two possible time constraints). Remember: • If you choose option R then the task ends and you will earn 40¢ and the other player will earn 40¢.
• If you choose option L, then the other player will have to choose between two options: o If the other player chooses option Y, then you will earn 0¢ and the other player will earn 160¢.
o If the other player chooses option X, then you will earn 80¢ and the other player will earn 80¢.

Now please make your decisions:
-If you are matched with a player B who has to choose before the 10-second timer expires: In this task, you will have to guess which percentage of participants choose each option in this experiment. If the difference between your guess and the true percentage is less than 5%, your guess will be considered "correct". You will be asked for 4 guesses. You will earn 10c extra for each correct guess.

[next screen]
Remember: Player A has to choose between two options: • If player A chooses option R then the task ends and player A will earn 40¢ and player B will earn 40¢.
• If player A chooses option L, then player B will have to choose between two options: o If player B chooses option Y, then player A will earn 0¢ and player B will earn 160¢.
o If player B chooses option X, then player A will earn 80¢ and player B will earn 80¢.
Among all player A individuals, who have to make a choice for two possible time constraints of player B, you have to guess the percentage of them who choose option L.
-If player B has to choose before the 10-second timer expires, you guess that the percentage of player A who choose option L is: [slider from 0% to 100% in 5% intervals] -If player B has to choose after the 10-second timer expires, you guess that the percentage of player A who choose option L is: [slider from 0% to 100% in 5% intervals] Among all player B individuals who choose under each time constraint, you have to guess the percentage of them who choose option X.
-If player B have to choose before the 10-second timer expires, you guess that the percentage of player B who choose option X is: [slider from 0% to 100% in 5% intervals] -If player B have to choose after the 10-second timer expires, you guess that the percentage of player B who choose option X is: [slider from 0% to 100% in 5% intervals]

PLAYER B
In this task, there are two players, player A and player B. The computer has randomly assigned you to be player B and the other player you will be matched with will be player A.
The other player (A) has to choose between two options: • If the other player chooses option R then the task ends and you will earn 40¢ and the other player will earn 40¢.
• If the other player chooses option L, then you will have to choose between two options.
For the case that the player A who is matched with you chooses option L, in the next screen, please choose between option Y and option X BEFORE/AFTER the 10-second timer in your screen expires (the time that counts is when you click on the option chosen, not on the Continue button).

Note:
If you fail to comply with the time constraint, both of you will earn 40¢.

[next screen]
Please choose BEFORE/AFTER the time expires: o Option Y: you will earn 160¢ and the other player will earn 0¢.
o Option X: you will earn 80¢ and the other player will earn 80¢.